This paper analyzes a model of overlapping generations in which there are two currencies. There are two agents born in each period, and these agents have completely heterogeneous preferences and endowments. The paper shows that there are monetaly equilibria in which one country can sustain a trade deficit whose present value is arbitrarily close to that of its trading partner's entire stream of resources. Hence, there may be no limit to the present value of a country's trade deficit, even if the equilibrium for the world economy satisfies an intertemporal efficiency criterion.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to show that monetary policies can give rise to arbitrarily large imbalances of trade in models of overlapping generations. In these models, when one agent is born in each period, a monetary policy has real economic effects through the intergenerational transfers that it facili tates. In international economics, it is natural to consider models in which there are several agents in each generation. Hence, it is possible for mone tary policies to give rise to both intergenerational and intragenerational transfers of resources. If we identify sequences of agents with countries, then the net transfers between them are trade surpluses or deficits. We show below that, for any specification of the sequences of endowments and preferences, any trade profile is consistent with some (world) monetary policy. In essence, no matter what the savings preferences and endowments of different countries are, monetmy policies alone can have arbitrarily large real international effects.
I
International economists have known that there are general equilibria in which there are imbalances of trade since David Gale's (1971) important contribution. Indeed, Gale noted that dynamic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents in which there is balanced trade are the exception rather than the rule. In Gale's model, agents accumulate real physical capital as a store of value; technologies are identical across countries and trade imbalances arise because of differences in savings rates. Although there was no financial asset in his model, Gale conjectured that monetary policies might be a source of imbalances of trade. This paper extends Gale's result by describing exchange economies in which financial assets, not physical capital, serve as stores of value. These economies are completely heterogeneous; preferences, endowments, and monetary policies are entirely general, and we do not confine our attention to steady states.
Some economists object to the role money plays in models of overlapping generations; they argue that these models are more descriptions of social security schemes than they are models of money.! We feel, however, that these criticisms are much less valid in models of international finance. Balance-of-payments accounting serves as a tedious reminder that a current account deficit is simply the sum of the capital account surplus and the loss of official reserves. Under a regime of flexible exchange rates, the change in official reserves is negligible. Hence, the modern approach to modeling external disequilibria focuses upon the forces influencing the adjustment of an economy's stock of net foreign assets. This is of course exactly the way in which closed-economy models of overlapping generations deal with the dynamic pattern of asset accumulation.
The analysis in open economies becomes slightly more subtle because international and intergenerational trades occur in each period. We can see then that models of overlapping generations in international finance are really models of the capital account; by focusing on the accumulation of financial assets, one can infer trade patterns for an economy.
Several authors have explored models of overlapping generations in international economics. The work of Kareken and Wallace (1981) is seminal; they showed that the equilibrium level of the exchange rate is indeterminate. Their model has one good per period and uses stationary preferences, endowments, and money-supply processes. Buiter (1981) studies a one-sector growth model in which countries have different rates of time preference, and Sibert (1985) analyzes country-specific tax policies in a similar model. Neither of these models uses financial assets explicitly. Our work focused upon the money-supply processes as the determinant of trade patterns; the central question we address is what kinds of trade imbalances can be sustained by monetary policies in which the exchange rate is well defined. We show below that almost any trade deficit can be sustained by the appropriate monetary policies.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The second section presents a sharply focused example to illustrate the main results of this research. Section 3 presents a general model in which there are two moneys; in this model, there are finitely many commodities in each period and agents have heterogeneous endowments and preferences. The fourth section establishes the main result, and section 5 is a brief conclusion.
2. An example of monetary policy as a source of trade imbalance
In order to whet the reader's appetite for the general analysis in the next two sections, we present a simple example of a monetary policy that gives rise to an infinitely large trade deficit. An important feature of this example is that the monetary policy we describe makes every agent in the world economy better off than in the nonmonetary equilibrium. Hence, the exis tence of this world monetary policy and its concomitant trade imbalance is a strong Pareto improvement over the autarkic allocations.
In order to keep the example tractable, we shall assume that there is only one commodity per period; this commodity cannot be stored. We shall assume further that there are two sequences of agents whose preferences and endowments are identical in every respect. There are two old agents at the beginning of time; otherwise, there are two agents born in each period and each agent lives for two periods. Let us call the first sequence of agents Alphas and the second such sequence Betas. The government of the Alphas issues red money and the government of the Betas issues blue money. There are no restrictions placed on the agents participating in the markets for goods, red money or blue money.
We describe now the endowments and preferences of the agents in the world economy. It is convenient to write G t = {at> f3t}; this is the set of people born in generation t. As we show below, the exchange rate is constant in a perfect-foresight equilibrium. Now let the exchange rate be one. Without loss of generality, let the price of the consumption good at time one be given by pI = 1; further let the price of red money at time 1 be one. The international monetary policy (/-L, v) is such that the world supply of real balances keeps goods prices stationary. Using a first-order difference equation, it is possible to check that the goods price sequence p = (1, 1, The intuition behind this surprising example is that a growing world economy needs an increasing supply of real balances. Since money serves as a store of value, there are world monetary policies that give rise to equilibria whose allocations are strongly Pareto-superior to those in a nonmonetary equilibrium. If one country gives its citizens money, then it is giving them seigniorage. Since there are absolutely no restrictions on goods markets or financial markets, agents who desire to accumulate real balances that selve as stores of value may do so. The Alphas have more money (of both kinds) than they need, but the Betas do not have enough. Hence, the Betas trade real goods for financial assets. We have constructed the world monetary policy so that the latter-day Alphas always dis-save and their latter-day Beta brethren always acquire red money as a store of value.
The reader may be interested in how the analysis in this paper extends to models of overlapping generations like those in Blanchard and Fischer's influential text (1989) . They analyze production economies in which physical capital serves as a store of value and the number of agents (and hence the labor supply) is increasing geometrically. Blanchard and Fischer assume that agents have separable preferences, and their analysis focuses upon stationary models, although they do analyze nonstationary equilibria. They note that monetary equilibria can occur only when the rate of return of money is not dominated by that of physical capital. As will become clear in the analysis below, in an international monetary equilibrium it is necessary that the rates of return of all moneys be equal and that this rate of return be no less than that on real economic investment in any country.
It is worth mentioning that the analysis of a production economy with an increasing labor supply is no more general than that below, because an arbitrary sequence of endowments in an exchange economy can always be interpreted as per capita endowments after the production activity has taken place. Finally, our assumption that preferences are completely heterogeneous is more general than that used in Blanchard and Fischer. With all this said, the reader may feel that there is something special about the example above, but this is not so. In the next two sections, we show that for any sequence of endowments and preferences in the world economy, virtually any trade pattern can be implemented by some world monetary policy. We hope that this hoI's d'oeuvre has fortified the reader for the larger course that lies ahead.
The model and equilibrium
The model is a simple extension of that developed by Balasko and Shell (1981) 3 in their fundamental paper. In that paper, Balasko and Shell analyze an economy in which there is one agent born in each period. Each agent lives for two periods, and there is one agent who is 'old' at the beginning of the model. Goods cannot be stored, and this gives rise to a role of money as a store of value. The agents have heterogeneous preferences and endowments, and there are [ goods available at each point in time. Each agent has preferences such that the closure of her indifference surfaces are contained in the positive orthant of [-dimensional or 2[-dimensional Euclidean space. Further, each agent is endowed with strictly positive amounts of every good in each period of her life, and the agents are subject to monetary taxes and transfers that are imposed by a central authority.
We extend this model by assuming that there are two agents born in each period, with each agent living for two periods. 4 There are two people who are old at the beginning of the economy, and they live for only one period. During each period of time, there is a finite number of commodities; these commodities are perishable and cannot be stored. This implies that there may be a role for financial assets as stores of value. We assume that there are two moneys that serve this function.
It will be convenient to represent commodity bundles, prices, and govern ment policies as sequences. The space of allocations is
and the world economy's sequence of
endowments is an element w E X, It will be convenient to denote the set of people born at time t by G/; we shall think of the two elements of this set as being an Alpha person and a Beta person, both of generation t. Let Go = {ao, l3o} denote the two old people alive at the beginning of the economy. Then G = (Go, G 1 , .
•• ) represents the world economy's demo graphic structure. In these models, there is no sharp distinction between monetary and fiscal policies. It is convenient to call the governments' policy tools lump-sum tax transfers. In a model in which there is one government, such a policy is a sequence of monetary taxes and transfers that are imposed upon the agents in the different periods of their lives. In a setting in which there is more than one government, the description of lump-sum money transfers is more complicated than the usual case. For anyone old at the beginning of the economy, we have hE Go, and a money transfer is given as (mJ" nJ,) E 1R 2 with the first element of this two-tuple being interpreted as m-money receipts and the second element as n-money receipts. For any other agent h E G t with t ~ 1 we have (m;" n;" m;,+ 1, n;,+ I) E [~4 as her lump-sum tax transfers.
Let mE M be a sequence whose typical element is a money transfer, where M is the set of feasible lump-sum money transfers. M can be identified with (1R 2 X 1R 2 ) X (1R 4 X 1R 4 ) X (1R 4 X 1R 4 ) X ... , where we have taken care again to restate that there are two agents born in each period. Notice that we have already adopted an internationalist perspective because we are considering both m-money and n-money monetary policies in this description.
The agents in the world economy are free to hold or create as much inside money, of either denomination, as they please. Let xi;'" and xi; 11 be the gross additions, at time t, to Ms. h's holdings of m-money and n-money, respec tively. We impose that xkm~o and xh,Il~O for hE Go, xi"m +Xi,+I,," ~ 0 and xh,1l +X;,·I'l,1l
which has the interpretation that no one can die as a net debtor in either currency and where we have imposed the implicit constraint that no one holds money when she is not alive,S We restrict our attention as usual to 5Again, we are using the convention that a subscript is the index of an agent and a superscript is the index of a dated commodity or a dated money. Notice that agents can borrow or lend arbitrarily large amounts of either money in the first period of their lives as long as they do not die in debt.
J 1 ~ perfectly-foreseen present-value commodity prices; let us call the set of such prices 9. 6 The consumption choices of the agents satisfy:
..
(I) maximize U" x", x" ' subject to
for h E Gil with t ~ 1.
Note that we have implicitly defined w" in these expressions; this is the present value of agent h's wealth, including the taxes and transfers that accrue to her during the course of her life. Let us define the aggregate supply of m-money and n-money in period t as
s=1 hEGsUG,_1 s=1 hEG,UG,_1 6 We adopt the normalization that the price of the consumption good 1 in period 1 is unity. Further, it is important to emphasize that there are many other equilibria in this model. They correspond to intrinsically uncertain realizations of the exchange rate process. An analysis of these equilibria is entirely beyond the scope of this paper.
where m ' E IR and likewise n l E IR. This allows us to define a monetary competitive equilibrium as a sequence of commodity prices PEg; and a sequence of money prices (pl, lII, pl, n, p2, m, p2, n, ... ) • This result is entirely analogous to that of Kareken and Wallace (1981) ; they call it the dominance result. Kareken and Wallace adopt the normaliza tion that the price of the single consumption good is unity in each period; hence, their result can be interpreted that the real exchange rate is constant. Since we have used the normalization that p l, I is unity, our result states that the present value of the real exchange rate is constant.
In Proof. Since we are in an international monetary competitive equilibrium, the price of m-money is a constant pin > 0 and the exchange rate is a constant e> 0, Then Proposition 3 and the monotony of preferences imply that (X/~,m, Xh,ll) = (0,0) if h E Go; these two facts also imply the first equality in the second line of the proposition above. The money market equilibrium then implies the third equality. ..
Proposition 4 states that the entire world money supply at time t is held as a store of value by the young of generation t and that it is dis-saved in the second period of their lives. We can call the expression m' + en' the m money equivalent of the international money supply. Notice that this de pends upon the value of the exchange rate e.
Recall that the sequence of agents in the world economy is G = (G t 
(3) This is well defined because only finitely many of the elements of the right side of (3) We will be interested in monetary policies that display a simple property.
They are such that /-La = (m~ ,0), V o = (0, n{31 ), and /-LI = (m~ + m~+ 1,0), o 0 ( t VI = (0, m~, + m~~ 1) for t ~ 1. We shall call international monetary policies of this form country-specific monetary policies. They capture the (not entirely realistic) notion that countries tax and give subsidies to their own citizens only. For the rest of the paper, we shall examine only country-specific monetary policies. This is without much loss of generality because, for fixed pm and e, any international monetary policy can be implemented by some equivalent country-specific monetary policy.
Let PEg; and let agent h's wealth be given by WI" as in eq. (2). Then we can define the individual demand of agent h at time t as f,; (p, w,,) . We may now define a Wab'asian equilibrium as a price q = (p, pm, p") E 9 such that 
Definition. The w-monetary policy (/-L, v) is w-bona fide if 9(w, /-L, v) is not empty. The international monetary policy (/-L, v) is bona fide if it is w-bona fide for some w EX.
We shall now explore the circumstances under which an international monetary policy is consistent with world endowments given by any fixed w. In this analysis, we shall take advantage of the fact that there is more than one money in this model. The discussion below serves as a good example of how international monetary economics often permits a greater latitude of analysis than the closed economy monetary economics does.
Let PEg; and consider the sequence of incomes for the agents in the 
Proof. See the appendix.
Although Proposition 6 is only a simple extension of the characterization of a bona fide monetary policy in Balasko and Shell, it is a crucial step in obtaining the main result of this paper. It says that the m-money equivalent of the world money supply must satisfy a lower and an upper bound in each period. This implies immediately that if a country-specific monetary policy causes the world supply of real balances to be too large (or too small) at some finite time t, then there will never be an international monetary competitive equilibrium. This follows from the usual arguments using backward induc tion.
Imagine, for example, that the Beta country conducts such an expansionary a monetary policy that (5) is indeed violated. Then the value of n-money would be zero for all time, and only m-money might serve as a store of value in the world economy. Further, fix pm and consider a value of the exchange rate e such that, given the world monetary policy (/-L, v) , eq. (5) is eventually violated. Then this exchange rate represents too great a devaluation or revaluation of n-money, and such an exchange rate would cause an immedi ate breakdown of the international monetary competitive equilibrium. This captures the notion of an exchange rate crisis.
Sustainable trade deficits
The central question that we address in this section is the extent to which monetary policies are consistent with imbalances of trade in this dynamic general equilibrium. We begin by establishing a simple result for a nonmone tary world economy. This is an economy where (p." lJ) = 0 identically. Con sider a price-income equilibrium, and let us define the sequence w" by the obvious w" = (w ao ' w al ' ... ), with wf3 being entirely analogous. likewise so that w f31 = (8/0 + 8»L hEG who We are dealing with a model of overlapping generations in which there ~re four agents alive in each period in which each agent has strictly positive endowments of all goods. Balasko and Shell (1980, proposition 3.11) show that an equilibrium exists for this econ omy. Let PEg; be an equilibrium. Recall that wit = p1Wh for hE Go and w =ptwt +pt+lwt+l for hE G with t> 1 Since sw = W for t> 0 the
result is established.
• This proposition shows that we can divide the world's resources in such a manner so that the Alphas command an arbitrarily large share of the economy's income in each period. We have also established that we can choose a sequence of endowments W EX such that the W = (w", w(3) repre sents any division of r that we might desire. The power of Balasko and Shell's (1980) work is that for each such W E X there is an equilibrium in the nonmonetary economy.
We have now developed sufficiently many ideas to prove our main result: Recall that the world's stream of resources is given by r = Liz E Ow". Of course, the value of each Beta's consumption is equal to her income. The goods market equilibrium condition in each period implies that the value of the consumption of the Alphas can be made arbitrarily close to pt. r l , which is of course the present value of the entire world's resources in that period. This implies that the value of the Alpha country's trade deficit can be made arbitrarily close to plW~ in each period.
• This theorem is true both for cases in which there is a uniform bound on world resources and in ones in which there is no such uniform bound. In the case where there is no uniform bound on world resources, the theorem implies that the present value of the Alpha country's trade deficit can be made arbitrarily large, even if the time 1 prices of goods satisfy an efficiency criterion. Indeed,the example presented in section 2 is exactly this kind of a world economy. This theorem can be interpreted as saying that in a growing world economy in which future goods are priced efficiently, the present discounted value of a country's trade deficit may not be bounded.
The reader may feel that there is something perverse about the theorem because the surplus country Beta is accommodating this equilibrium by punishing itself with monetary contractions. But this is exactly the role that a devaluation plays in international finance. To see this, fix total world re sources r and the international monetary policy (fL, v) and then consider a devaluation of m-money. For a fixed m-money price pill, this implies that e rises or equivalently that p" rises. If (/-L, v) is w-bona fide for both the original and new exchange rates, then the devaluation of m-money is an expansion of the share of the increase in the world supply of real balances accruing to each citizen of the Beta country. This is precisely how a devalua tion 'improves' the trade balance of the Alpha country. The exact effect that such a devaluation will have on the entire pattern of trade is difficult to determine at this level of generality. It will depend upon the profile of endowments, the pattern of preferences, and both country-specific monetary policies.
We took advantage of a very important fact in the proof of the theorem. In models of international finance it is always possible to construct nontrivial monetary policies giving rise to equilibria in which the prices of all moneys are not zero. This is not true in a closed economy in which there is a single agent born in each period. The fact that there are two agents born in each period allows us to design monetary policies that are trivially bona fide for any aggregate price-income equilibrium. These policies will always have real effects in the transfer of resources between the agents of one generation, even if there is absolutely no role otherwise for money as a store of value.
The structure of these arguments can obviously be extended to an n-coun try world .where n > 2. We note in passing that any perfect-foresight interna tional monetary equilibrium will have all bilateral exchange rates fixed, and we state a simple corollary of the theorem. Proof. This follows from a construction analogous to that in the theorem.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that there are general conditions under which monetary equilibria give rise to arbitrarily large imbalances of trade. By allowing for the use of two moneys as stores of value, it showed that there are always nontrivial monetary equilibria for any international economy. It con firmed in a general setting earlier work that had established that the exchange rate is constant in a perfect-foresight equilibrium. We emphasized throughout the discussion the distinction between the roles money plays in .affecting international and intergenerational transfers of resources. Finally, we would be remiss not to mention that the analysis of bona fide interna tional monetary policies gives rise naturally to the study of the set real exchange rates consistent with the monetary policy (fL, II) . This is an avenue of research that we hope to pursue in the near future.
